绿色农产品生态补偿利益主体的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of the Ecological Compensation Stakeholders for Green Agricultural Products

作　　者：唐欣 孙小杰 王震 

机构地区：[1]华北理工大学经济学院

出　　处：《价格理论与实践》2020年第9期37-40,139,共5页Price:Theory & Practice

基　　金：河北省教育厅重点项目“农业信贷结构、配置效率与河北省农业经济增长”,项目编号:SD191051;华北理工大学杰出青年基金项目“农业科技服务的需求识别、供给机理与结构耦合”,项目编号:JQ201602;河北省“三三三人才工程”项目:“创业型农业科技服务的需求意愿、供给机理级结构差异耦合”,项目编号:A2016001128。

摘　　要：为进一步提高绿色农产品生态补偿的针对性和有效性,需对相关利益主体的决策行为进行深入研究。本文构建一个不完全信息动态博弈模型,研究生态补偿利益主体政府、企业和消费者三者间的博弈关系。通过建立三方的动态博弈模型,得出复制动态方程,进而求得各主体效用最大化条件下的演化稳定均衡。研究表明:降低生态补贴成本促进政府推行生态补偿政策,对生产传统农产品的企业进行税收或环境污染惩罚,可以促进农企生产绿色农产品;增加消费者购买绿色农产品的补偿,可以促进消费者购买绿色农产品。基于上述结论,本文为生态补偿机制的构建提出可行性建议,以期解决生态补偿利益主体间的矛盾,推动绿色农产品产业的顺利发展。To further improve the pertinence and effectiveness of ecological compensation for green agricultural products, it is necessary to conduct in-depth research on the decision-making behavior of stakeholders. This paper builds a dynamic game model with incomplete information to study the game relationship among the government, enterprises and consumers. By establishing a three-party dynamic game model, a copy dynamic equation is obtained, and then the evolutionary stable equilibrium under the condition of maximizing the utility of each subject is obtained. Studies have shown that reducing the ecological subsidies cost and promoting the government’s implementation of ecological compensation policies and imposing taxes or environmental pollution penalties on enterprises can promote the production of green agricultural products;increasing consumer compensation for purchasing green agricultural products can promote consumer purchases. Based on the above conclusions, this article puts forward feasible suggestions for the construction of an ecological compensation mechanism to solve the contradictions among the stakeholders of ecological compensation and promote the development of the green agricultural product industry.

关 键 词：绿色农产品 生态补偿 不完全信息动态博弈 复制动态方程 

分 类 号：F323[经济管理—产业经济] X322[环境科学与工程—环境工程]