产业政策与上市公司并购重组溢价——基于并购重组委行政审核的经验证据  

Industrial Policy and M&A Premium of China Listed Companies--Based on the Empirical Evidence of Administrative Verification of M&A Committee

作　　者：袁业虎[1] 汤晟 管考磊[1] YUAN Yehu;TANG Sheng;GUAN Kaolei(School of Accouting,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang 330013,China;School of Management,Jinan University,Guangzhou 510632,China)

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学会计学院,江西南昌330013 [2]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《财经论丛》2021年第4期61-71,共11页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71962010);国家自然科学基金项目(71862015)。

摘　　要：基于并购方视角的议价理论和被并购方视角的隐性获利理论,本文以我国2008~2018年并购重组委审核通过的中国沪深两市A股上市公司并购重组事项为样本,研究了产业政策对上市公司并购重组溢价的影响。研究发现,受产业政策支持的上市公司为并购重组事项支付了更低的并购溢价。进一步研究发现,当上市公司属于民营企业、所处市场化程度较高的地区时,受产业政策支持的上市公司为并购重组事项所支付的并购溢价水平也更低;另外,并购重组实现后,受产业政策支持的民企上市公司展现出了更高的股票回报率,隐性获利由此得以真正实现。本文的研究结论为上市公司和监管部门提供了重要的管理和政策启示。Based on the bargaining theory from the perspective of the acquirer and hidden earnouts theory from the perspective of the acquired party,this paper examines the impact of industrial policies on the M&A premium of listed companies based on the M&A cases of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets approved by the M&A committee from 2008 to 2018.The results are as follows:First,Listed companies supported by industrial policies have paid a lower M&A premium for M&A;Second,when listed companies are private enterprises,or are located in regions with a higher degree of marketization,those supported by industrial policies have paid a lower level of M&A premium for M&A.Moreover,those listed private enterprises supported by industrial policies have better performance and produce a higher rate of stock returns after the realization of M&A,and the target companies do realize the hidden earnouts brought by M&A.The conclusions of this paper provide important management and policy implications for listed companies and regulators.

关 键 词：议价能力理论 隐性获利理论 并购重组 产业政策 

分 类 号：F420[经济管理—产业经济]