我国政策性农业保险市场低水平均衡的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Supply and Demand Dual-cooled in Policy-oriented Agricultural Insurance Market in China

作　　者：张卓 李秉坤[2] 尹航[3] ZHANG Zhuo;LI Bing-kun;YIN Hang(School of Humanities and Management,Jinzhou Medical University,Jinzhou 121000,China;Institute of Harbin University of Commerce,Finance and Public Management,Harbin 150028,China;The People’s Bank of China,Dalian Central Sub-branch,Dalian 116001,China)

机构地区：[1]锦州医科大学人文与管理学院,辽宁锦州121000 [2]哈尔滨商业大学财政与公共管理学院,哈尔滨150028 [3]中国人民银行大连市中心支行,辽宁大连116001

出　　处：《哈尔滨商业大学学报（社会科学版）》2021年第1期117-128,共12页Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition

基　　金：2020年辽宁省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目“辽宁省优势特色农产品保险财政补贴政策优化研究”(JYTQNRW2020096);2019年辽宁省社科基金规划项目“辽宁省政策性农业保险政府补贴效率研究”(L19BJY047)。

摘　　要：结合我国农业保险市场发展的现实,基于参与主体有限理性假设,通过构建包含三主体的演化博弈模型,对农险市场的低水平均衡及其形成的深层次原因进行研究。研究发现,政府补贴强度变化及保险公司保费厘定策略调整对农户、保险公司间参保与承保稳定策略形成影响,由于农业保险市场中政府补贴存在显著的信号示范效应,当新型农产品相关保险体系中政府补贴缺位时,农户与保险公司缺乏实现农险市场规模扩张的动力及意愿。Combining with the development ofagricultureal insurance in China,this paper,based on the hypothesis of participants’bounded rationality and game model of three main bodies’participation evolutionary,analyzes the influence of government’s subsidies change and insurance company’s premium set strategy adjustment on the formation of stable strategy involving farmers’insurance participation and insurance company’s insurance acceptance.It is because government’s subsidies in the agricultural insurance market signals a significant demonstration effect that two main bodies including farmers and insurance company are lack of power and will to break the equilibrium and expand the market in the absence of government’s subsidies under the new agricultural insurance system,which well explains weak state characteristics of agricultural insurance market in China and the reasons for the state maintenance,which is considered as the path to explore supply and demand in the dual-cooled policy support system in the later content.

关 键 词：农业保险 演化博弈 低水平均衡 

分 类 号：F840.6[经济管理—保险]