基于政府补贴的制造商绿色产品开发博弈模型  

Game model of manufacturer's green product development based on government subsidy

作　　者：陆媛媛[1] 李阳[1] LU Yuan-yuan;LI Yang(School of Mathematics,Jilin Normal University,Siping 136000,China)

机构地区：[1]吉林师范大学数学学院,吉林四平136000

出　　处：《吉林师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2021年第2期63-70,共8页Journal of Jilin Normal University:Natural Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71501082)。

摘　　要：研究了政府补贴激励下,制造商和零售商分别在相应的领域对绿色产品制造和销售做出相应努力时的最优决策问题,建立了在政府补贴制造商以及制造商补贴零售商的条件下的Stackelberg主从博弈模型,为包括政府、制造商和零售商等供应链主体在开发绿色产品提供一些理论基础和实践指导.The optimal decision problem of green product manufacturing and green product sales under government subsidy incentive was studied.A Stackelberg master follower game model was established under the condition that the government subsidizes the manufacturer and the manufacturer subsidizes the retailer.This study provided some theoretical basis and practical guidance for supply chain players including government,manufacturers and retailers in developing green products.

关 键 词：政府补贴 绿色供应链 STACKELBERG博弈 社会福利 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]