不完全契约下专利联盟互惠性优化研究  

Study on Reciprocity Optimization of Patent Alliance under Incomplete Contract

作　　者：刘一君 张同建[2] LIU Yi-jun;ZHANG Tong-jian(School of Economics and Management,Shanghai University of Applied Technology,Shanghai 201418,China;Management School,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang Jiangsu 212013,China)

机构地区：[1]上海应用技术大学经济与管理学院,上海201418 [2]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2021年第4期8-11,共4页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(18BJL043)。

摘　　要：专利联盟是实现专利应用和科技成果转化的重要平台。由于不完全契约的影响,中国专利联盟运营效率较低。不完全契约引发"搭便车""敲竹杠"等机会主义行为,并引发二次"反公地悲剧"效应,抑制了联盟效率。理性经济人下的严格自利偏好无法解决这些机会主义问题,同时,制度经济学理论也未给出可行的方案。在行为经济视角下,互惠性理念与行为是解决专利联盟不完全契约问题的有效手段,值得深入探索和研究。The patent alliance is an important platform to realize the patent application and scientific achievements transformation.Because of the incomplete contract,China’s patent alliance operation efficiency is low.The incomplete contract caused the"free rider"and"hold up"of opportunism behavior,and the second"tragedy of anti commons"effect,which inhibits alliance efficiency.The strict self-interest preference under rational economic man can not solve these problems of opportunism,at the same time,the theory of institutional economics have not given a feasible scheme.In the perspective of behavior economics,the reciprocal concept and behavior is the effective means to solve the patent alliance problems under incomplete contracts,worthy of further exploration and development.

关 键 词：专利联盟 专利丛林 不完全契约 反公地悲剧 互惠性偏好 

分 类 号：F125.25[经济管理—世界经济]