Some Kinds of Bargaining Equilibria of Multi-objective Games  

作　　者：Chun WANG Hui YANG 

机构地区：[1]School of Mathematics and Statistics,Guizhou University,Guiyang 550025,China

出　　处：《Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica》2021年第2期201-213,共13页应用数学学报（英文版）

基　　金：supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.11271098);by the Science and Technology Fund Program of Guizhou Province(No.7425)。

摘　　要：To solve the choice of multi-objective game's equilibria,we construct general bargaining games called self-bargaining games,and define their individual welfare functions with three appropriate axioms.According to the individual welfare functions,we transform the multi–objective game into a single-objective game and define its bargaining equilibrium,which is a Nash equilibrium of the single-objective game.And then,based on certain continuity and concavity of the multi-objective game's payoff function,we proof the bargaining equilibrium still exists and is also a weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium.Moreover,we analyze several special bargaining equilibria,and compare them in a few examples.

关 键 词：multi-objective game bargaining game individual welfare function bargaining equilibria 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]