上市公司违规、关系文化与银行信贷风险控制--基于证监会处罚公告前后的跨期考察  

Corporate Fraud,Guanxi Culture,and Banks’Credit Risk Control:An Investigation Around the Announcement of CSRC Enforcement

作　　者：徐莉萍[1] 夏雪 滕飞[1] 辛宇[1] LIPING XU;XUE XIA;FEI TENG;YU XIN

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院

出　　处：《中国会计评论》2020年第2期311-340,共30页China Accounting Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71672198,71772188,71790603)的资助。

摘　　要：本文研究上市公司违规过程中银行信贷风险控制的动态演变过程,并结合关系文化探讨正式制度和非正式制度在此过程中的相互作用关系。按照公司违规发生、违规处罚公告两个时间节点,本文将整个违规过程划分为违规之前、违规期间和违规监管后三个阶段,以2003—2015年A股上市公司为研究样本,考察上市公司违规过程中的借款条件变化情况,以此探讨银行是否能够获取以及如何利用私有信息和公开信息进行信贷风险控制。研究结果表明:银行具有一定的获取私有信息的能力,在上市公司违规行为被监管公告前就已经提高借款利率,并通过缩短借款期限及提高短期借款担保要求等非价格措施进行信贷风险控制;当违规行为被监管后,银行会继续实施这些严格的非价格风险控制措施。进一步研究发现,关系文化弱化了银行在公司违规期间的信贷风险控制效率:在公司违规期间,公司所处地区的关系文化程度越高,债务契约越宽松;而当公司违规行为被监管后,关系文化的影响不再显著;而且,关系文化的作用因公司产权性质的不同而具有较强的异质性;同时,违规行为越严重,银行所采用的债务契约越严苛。本文比较系统地从债权人视角研究了证券市场监管的经济后果,为我们更好地理解银行的信贷风险管理行为提供了经验证据支持。This study investigates the dynamic process of bank’s credit risk control during corporate fraud and the effects of guanxi culture on this process.We divide the whole corporate fraud timeline into three periods:pre-fraud period,fraud period(before fraud regulation)and post-fraud period(after fraud regulation).Using data on China’s A-share list companies from 2003 to 2015,we empirically study how loan contracts change in these three periods and how guanxi influence the changing process to explore whether and how banks use private and public information to control credit risks.We find that during the fraud period banks can acquire fraud-related private information,they shorten loan maturity and ask for more collateral to control credit risks.In the post-fraud period,banks still use the maturity and collateral provisions to control risks.We further find that guanxi weakens the bank’s credit risk control efficiency during the fraud period,the higher the guanxi level of the region located for listed firms,the looser the loan contracts.However,in the post-fraud period guanxi has no effect on the loan contracts.We further find an obvious heterogeneity effect of guanxi on firms with different nature of property right.Simultaneously,we also find the more serious the corporate fraud,the stricter the loan contracts.This study systematically investigates the effectiveness of capital market supervision from the perspective of creditors,providing empirical evidence for rule by law.

关 键 词：公司违规 信贷风险 债务契约 关系文化 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F832.4