财政补贴VS.政府自营:“兜底”动机下政府干预基本公共品提供的策略选择  

Fiscal Subsidy VS.Proprietary Trading:Study on the Government’s Intervention Decision on the Supply of Public Goods under the“Catch-all”Motive

作　　者：姚东旻 李浩阳 张鹏远 YAO Dong-min;LI Hao-yang;ZHANG Peng-yuan(Center for China Fiscal Development,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 102206,China)

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学中国财政发展协同创新中心,北京102206

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2021年第3期100-108,共9页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目资助(20AJY020);战略经济北京市高精尖学科支持项目(GJJ2019163)。

摘　　要：现代政府的一个基本功能就是保障全民的基本公共品(公共服务),因此与一般商品相比,当企业无法满足部分居民的基本公共品需求时,政府具有全面覆盖居民需求的"兜底"动机。本文使用内生化的市场覆盖因素刻画政府的"兜底"动机,并基于市场垂直竞争框架建立了基准模型和政府干预模型两个模型以讨论政府干预的最优策略选择问题。研究显示:首先,消费者支付意愿和厂商生产意愿两个因素决定了政府干预与否的边界条件;其次,这两个因素还分别确定了补贴和自营两种干预方式的可行范围,政府应选择与之匹配的干预方式,否则将因干预方式的错配而致使干预无效;最后,出于消费者剩余最大化考虑,政府应在对应的匹配范围内选择补贴高质量厂商或自营高质量的干预策略。基于此,本文认为在现实中,政府应当重点分析未覆盖市场的产生原因,当未覆盖市场由厂商生产意愿过低所致时选择补贴高质量厂商策略,当部分未覆盖消费者具有迫切需求时选择自营高质量策略。One of the modern government’s basic functions is to satisfy all residents’need for public goods.Hence,in contrast to other commodities,the government will be motivated to intervene the supply system of public goods once the firms which compete spontaneously in the market fail to cover all the residents’public needs.So,how can the government decide whether to intervene according to the results of market spontaneous competition?What is the standard for the government when choosing an intervention approach?How will the intervention affect the consumers’surplus in the market?Much remain to be discussed on these issues.Given the lack of literature on this issue,the government and the market coverage factor into the vertical competition structure is introduced to study how should the government makes intervention decisions in market competition.Our study differs from other similar research on vertical competition structure inmaking the market coverage factor endogenous by considering the effect of government intervention on the range of the uncovered market.The results show that:first,the boundary setting of government intervention depends on the market features of consumers’willingness to pay and firms’willingness to produce;second,the two market features also determine the feasibility range of the two intervention approaches,the subsidy approach and the proprietary approach,which implies thatthe government should make intervention decision matched for the two features’range,otherwise,the intervention could fail due to mismatch;third,to maximize the consumers’surplus,the government should choose the strategy of subsidizing high-quality firm in subsidy approach of the strategy of following high-quality firm in proprietary approach.Our theoretical findings provide not only the abstract logic in intervention decision for the government,but also practical application in reality.In real market of public goods,the government can subsidize the high-quality firm when the uncovered market is caused by the firm

关 键 词：政府干预 市场覆盖 政府自营 财政补贴 子博弈完美纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学] F062.9