三元主体交互视角下网络谣言监管的博弈演化研究  

Research on Game Evolution of Internet Rumor Regulation from the Perspective of Ternary Subject Interaction

作　　者：杨洋洋 谢雪梅[1] Yang Yangyang;Xie Xuemei(School of Economics and Management,Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Beijing 100876,China)

机构地区：[1]北京邮电大学经济管理学院,北京100876

出　　处：《现代情报》2021年第5期167-177,共11页Journal of Modern Information

基　　金：北京市社会科学基金项目“基于首都舆情大数据的公众对政府信任分析和精准引导研究”(项目编号:18GLB031)。

摘　　要：[目的/意义]网络谣言的传播会扰乱公共秩序,引起公众的焦虑和恐慌,研究网络谣言的监管策略,对网络生态环境的和谐发展具有重要的理论价值和实践意义。[方法/过程]基于政府、媒体、网民三元主体交互的视角,构建网络谣言监管的博弈模型,采用系统动力学方法对构建的博弈模型进行演化仿真分析,并运用灵敏度分析探究外生变量对博弈策略的影响。[结果/结论]4种不同的局部均衡策略最终的演化结果都是(1,1)策略;网民监管参与度的增加能够有效地提高博弈策略的演化速度;初始监管成本变化对政府博弈策略的影响程度最大,政府奖励变化对媒体博弈策略的影响程度最大。[Purpose/Significance]The spread of Internet rumors will disturb public order and cause public anxiety and panic.It is of great theoretical and practical significance for the harmonious development of network ecological environment to study the supervision strategy of network rumor.[Method/Process]Based on the interaction of government,media and Internet users,this paper constructed a game model of Internet rumor supervision.It used the method of system dynamics to simulate the evolution of the game model.This paper used sensitivity analysis to explore the influence of exogenous variables on game strategy.[Result/Conclusion]The final evolution results of four different local equilibrium strategies were(1,1)strategies.The increase of the participation of Internet users'supervision can effectively improve the evolution speed of game strategy.The change of initial supervision cost has the greatest influence on government game strategy,and the change of government reward has the greatest influence on media game strategy.

关 键 词：三元主体交互 网络谣言监管 博弈演化 系统仿真 

分 类 号：G206.3[文化科学—传播学]