非对称压力下大用户直购电价格的讨价还价博弈  

The bargain model for pricing of direct-power-purchasing under asymmetric pressure

作　　者：徐云[1] 应黎明[1] XU Yun;YING Liming(School of Electrical Engineering and Automation,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430074,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学电气与自动化学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《电力科学与技术学报》2021年第2期142-147,共6页Journal of Electric Power Science And Technology

基　　金：昆明电力交易中心有限责任公司科技项目(070201CH00003)。

摘　　要：在开放的电力市场环境下,市场中存在着生产者剩余或消费者剩余,这会直接影响到大用户直购电的定价策略。在此背景下,运用鲁宾斯坦模型的思想构建不完全信息、非对称压力下单一发电商与多个大用户以及多个发电商与单一大用户之间关于直购电力价格的讨价还价模型,给出不同情况下发电商与大用户的均衡收益。仿真结果表明,谈判双方的收益与双方的贴现率以及谈判过程中对保留价的估计有关。发电商或大用户可以利用与不同对象达成协议时的收益进行计算评估,合理地选择合作对象。文中模型及结论同样适用于市场中存在生产者剩余和消费者剩余的讨价还价博弈。In the open power market,there is a surplus of producers(generators)or consumers(large consumers),which will directly affect the pricing strategy of large consumers direct-power-purchasing.Under the background,with the Rubinstein model,this paper constructs the bargain models of pricing of large consumers direct-power-purchasing in single generator-various consumers and various generators-single consumer transaction under the circumstance of incomplete information and asymmetric pressure,and then gives the equilibrium profit of generators and large consumers.The result indicates that the profit of both parties is related to the discount rate and the estimation of the reserve price.Generators and large consumers can calculate and evaluate the profit of the agreement with different objects with the conclusion of the paper,and choose the cooperative object reasonably.The model and conclusion are also suitable to the bargaining game under the circumstance of the producer(generator)surplus or the consumer(large consumer)surplus in the market.

关 键 词：电力市场 直购电 讨价还价 不完全信息 非对称压力 

分 类 号：TM715[电气工程—电力系统及自动化] F407.6[经济管理—产业经济]