信托通道业务的私法构造及其规制逻辑  

The Private Law Structure of Trust Channel Business and Its Regulation Logic

作　　者：杨秋宇[1] YANG Qiuyu(Law School,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China)

机构地区：[1]北京大学法学院,北京100871

出　　处：《北京理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2021年第3期116-126,共11页Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology：Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目“公司减资对债权人通知义务研究”(19CFX049)。

摘　　要：信托通道业务的自益信托架构,是信托制度舶入中国后发生的本土化变异,与英美民事信托的他益架构不同。其中的委托人控制和受托人免责的特征有别于传统的民事信托,但仍契合于信托法理论并展现了信托在商业领域的制度弹性。信托通道业务源于中国商业银行规避金融监管的套利冲动,是中国影子银行的初级模式。金融监管部门规制信托通道业务的重点,在于防范系统性金融风险和国家产业政策目标落空。人民法院与金融监管部门对待信托通道业务的不同态度,展现了金融领域司法权和金融监管权之间的张力关系。基于司法权被动中立的特征以及金融活动的负外部性,人民法院在处理金融纠纷时应认真对待金融监管部门的监管逻辑。The self-settled trust structure in the channel business is the localization variation that occurs after the trust institution has been imported into China,which is different from the third-party benefit structure of the Anglo-American express trusts.The characteristics of its settlor control and trustee exemption,although different from the traditional express trusts,still fit the trust law theory and demonstrate the institutional flexibility of trusts in commercial field.The trust company’s channel business originates from the arbitrage impulse of China’s commercial banks to evade financial regulation,and is the primary mode of China's shadow banking.Its key issues in financial regulation are to prevent systemic financial risks and national industrial policy goals from failing.The misplaced strategy of the people's courts and financial regulation departments in China’s trust company’s channel business shows the regulatory competition between the judicial power and financial regulation power in the financial sector.As the passive neutrality of judicial power and the negative externalities of financial activities,the people's courts should treat the regulatory logic of financial regulatory power seriously based on the principle of respect specialty when handling financial disputes.

关 键 词：通道业务 自益信托 影子银行 司法权 金融监管权 

分 类 号：D912.28[政治法律—民商法学]