EPR制度下考虑不同融资策略的再制造决策研究  

Remanufacturing Decision Considering Different Financing Strategies under EPR Regulation

作　　者：菅利荣[1] 王丹丹[1] 付帅帅 JIAN Lirong;WANG Dandan;FU Shuaishuai(Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing,China;Southeast University,Nanjing,China)

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,南京市210016 [2]东南大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2021年第5期751-759,共9页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71573124);江苏高校哲学社会科学研究资助重大项目(2019SJZDA036);江苏省社会科学基金资助项目(18EYB015)。

摘　　要：基于生产者延伸责任制度(EPR)在再制造产业的实施,构建包含制造商和资金约束的再制造商的闭环供应链,分别探讨在选择银行贷款、向制造商直接贷款及延迟支付3种不同融资策略下闭环供应链的再制造决策问题。研究表明:在一定条件下,再制造商选择制造商贷款融资可实现与制造商的双赢;不论政府是否严格实施EPR制度,延迟支付策略有助于提升社会福利及再制造产品的社会效益;当政府严格实施EPR制度时,制造商的回收努力水平及再制造商的制造占比与融资贷款利率相关,且废旧产品转移价格是制造商是否愿意严格履行EPR制度的关键。Based on the implementation of the extended producer responsibility(EPR)in the remanufacturing industry,a closed-loop supply chain was constructed,which included a manufacturer and a capital-constrained remanufacturer.The remanufacturing decisions of the closed-loop supply chain were analyzed in three scenarios,bank loan,direct loan from manufacturer,and delay in payment.The results indicate that the remanufacturer can choose to loan from manufacturers to achieve a win-win situation with manufacturers under certain conditions.Regardless of whether the EPR is strictly implemented,the strategy of delay payment can help improve social welfare and the social benefit of remanufactured products.When the government strictly implements the EPR,the recycling effort level of manufacturers and the manufacturing proportion of remanufacturers are related to the interest rate of financing loans,and the transfer price of scrap products is the key to whether manufacturers are willing to strictly implement the EPR.

关 键 词：生产者延伸责任 再制造 资金约束 融资策略 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]