精准扶贫中协同扶贫博弈研究  被引量:1

Research on Coordinated Poverty Alleviation Game in Targeted Poverty Relief

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作  者:刘富成[1] 金哲娇 LIU Fucheng;JIN Zhejiao(College of Management, Changchun University, Changchun 130022, China)

机构地区:[1]长春大学管理学院,长春130022

出  处:《长春大学学报》2021年第5期41-45,共5页Journal of Changchun University

基  金:教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(16YJC790096);吉林省科技厅发展计划项目(20170418082FG)。

摘  要:探索精准扶贫中多元主体在脱贫过程中的最优发展路径。运用博弈论的方法分析精准扶贫中相关主体如政府与市场、市场与社会组织之间的博弈问题,分析各主体在提供服务过程中的行为策略和动机,进而分析精准扶贫中相关主体之间的博弈行为及过程。结果显示:政府采取激励与惩罚的双措施能够推动市场参与扶贫;合作社应发挥纽带作用,积极对接市场合作扶贫项目。This article aims to explore the optimal path for the multiple main subjects to get rid of poverty in targeted poverty relief, analyzes the game problems between related subjects such as the government and the market as well as market and social organizations by the game theory method, analyzes the strategies and motivations of each subject in the process of providing services, and analyzes the game behaviors and processes among related subjects in targeted poverty relief. The results show that the double measures of incentive and penalty that the government take can promote the market participation in poverty relief;cooperatives should give play to the role of ties, and positively connect with market cooperation projects.

关 键 词:扶贫 政府 市场 博弈论 

分 类 号:F323.8[经济管理—产业经济]

 

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