藏传因明与形式逻辑的“实概念”与“虚概念”理论的比较研究  

A Comparative Study on the Real Concept and False Concept in Tibetan Buddhist Logics and Formal Logics

作　　者：究麦老者 Jigs-Med-Blo-Gros(Qinghai Minzu University,Xining,810007)

机构地区：[1]青海民族大学,青海西宁810007

出　　处：《青海师范大学学报（藏文版）》2021年第1期117-124,共8页Journal of Qinghai Normal University (Tibetan language)

摘　　要：文章以藏传因明学中的“属实分别识”和“非属实分别识”,以及西方形式逻辑学中的“实概念”和“虚概念”为研究对象,探讨了这四种分别识或概念的总分别识和总概念是什么?何为四种分别识或概念的定义或性相?以及佐证这些定义的材料有哪些等问题。提出了分别识是属实分别识和非属实分别识的属,实概念和虚概念的属则是分别识中的名言分别识的观点。This paper mainly presents the definition of the Real Concept and Unreal Concept in Tibetan Buddhist logic,and real and virtual conception in Western logics.It analyzes what is classification standard definition for those,and what kind of instances they use,what is the difference between each other.Finally,the author gives his own opinion on all of the subjects,meanwhile,some suggestions about it are raised.

关 键 词：实概念 虚概念 属实分别识 非属实分别识 

分 类 号：B81-093.51[哲学宗教—逻辑学]