带成本性的背叛行动对间接互惠 种群进化博弈的影响  

The impact of defection with cost on the evolutionary game of indirect reciprocal population

作　　者：舒明炳 周永辉 SHU Mingbing;ZHOU Yonghui(School of Mathematical Sciences,Guizhou Normal University,Guiyang,Guizhou 550025,China;School of Big Data and Computer Sciences,Guizhou Normal University,Guiyang,Guizhou 550025,China)

机构地区：[1]贵州师范大学数学科学学院,贵州贵阳550025 [2]贵州师范大学大数据与计算机科学学院,贵州贵阳550025

出　　处：《贵州师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2021年第3期65-71,共7页Journal of Guizhou Normal University：Natural Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(No.11861025);贵州省科技计划项目(黔科合平台人才[2018]5769号)。

摘　　要：间接互惠通过声誉起作用,是促进种群合作的重要方式之一。借助于声誉的二阶评估社会规范,在经典的种群捐助博弈中引入带成本性的背叛行动,寻求合作性进化稳定策略的条件并探讨其平均收益。研究发现,在3种合作性进化稳定策略中,对坏声誉接受者采取较小成本的背叛行动,其策略所产生的平均收益小于无成本沉默策略的平均收益,而高于成本较高的惩罚策略的平均收益。Indirect reciprocity plays a role through reputation,which is one of the important ways to promote the evolution of cooperation.With the help of the social norm of second-order assessment of reputation,we introduce an action of defection with cost into a classical population donation game,and seek conditions of cooperative evolutionary stable strategies,and obtain its average return in population.It shows that among the three cooperative evolutionary stability strategies,the average return of the strategy by defection with lower cost to the recipient with bad reputation is less than that of the strategy by silence without cost,but higher than that of the strategy by punishment with higher cost.

关 键 词：间接互惠 二阶声誉评估 社会规范 捐助博弈 合作性进化稳定策略 

分 类 号：O178[理学—数学]