国际货币竞争的主从博弈分析及其对人民币国际化的启示  

Analysis of Stackelberg game in international currency competition and its inspiration on RMB internationalization

作　　者：代高琪 刘赫 纪尚伯 汪寿阳 DAI Gaoqi;LIU He;JI Shangbo;WANG Shouyang(School of Economics and Management,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China;School of Management Science and Engineering,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081,China;Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China)

机构地区：[1]中国科学院大学经济与管理学院,北京100190 [2]中央财经大学管理科学与工程学院,北京100081 [3]中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院,北京100190

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2021年第4期892-904,共13页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

摘　　要：人民币国际化进程必然面临来自现有主要国际货币的制约与阻力.本文从国际货币竞争的角度出发,建立了Stackelberg主从博弈模型,分析了后发的国际货币与在位的国际货币之间的博弈策略与均衡结果,研究表明,在两方国际货币的短期博弈中,一种货币的国际化进程必然造成另一国际货币利益的受损,后发的国际货币必然会受到阻力且会出现囚徒困境;但在长期反复博弈条件下,双方通过以牙还牙或利益补偿等策略互动,可能实现彼此的妥协与合作,从而达到帕累托改进的结果.因此,人民币国际化必将是一个漫长的动态的国际博弈过程.The process of RMB internationalization will inevitably face constraints and resistance from existing major international currencies.From the perspective of international currency competition,this paper establishes a Stackelberg model,to analyze the choice of competitive strategy and the game relationship of competition and cooperation between different international currencies.The game analysis result shows that the following currency will be suppressed by the leading currency,and the two currencies will have a prisoner’s dilemma.However,under the conditions of long-term repeated games,the two currencies will achieve mutual compromise and cooperation through strategic interactions such as reciprocity or interest compensation to achieve Pareto improvements.Therefore,the internationalization of the RMB is bound to be a long and dynamic international game process.

关 键 词：国际货币竞争 人民币国际化 STACKELBERG模型 长期合作 

分 类 号：F821.6[经济管理—财政学] O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]