董事违反勤勉义务赔偿责任的界定与豁免——以比较法分析为视角  

The Definition and Exemption of Directors'Liability for Breach of Duty of Diligence——From the Perspective of Comparative Analysis

作　　者：杨琦 YANG qi(East China University of Political Science and Law,Shanghai 200050)

机构地区：[1]华东政法大学经济法学院,上海200050

出　　处：《牡丹江大学学报》2021年第5期76-83,共8页Journal of Mudanjiang University

摘　　要：董事勤勉义务历来是经久不衰的话题。我国立法并未明确董事赔偿责任范围的界定,实践中存在侧重行政责任、免责情形过窄、赔偿机制不明确等突出问题,司法裁判多适用侵权法的规定,由于董事勤勉义务区别于普通注意义务,照搬侵权责任归责原则存在免责情形缺失、追责标准宽泛、赔偿范围过小的缺陷。比较法视野中,主要有以美国为主的商业自治模式、日本的内部程序控制模式,德国的侵权责任模式。通过对不同法域的董事赔偿责任界定的路径分析,在借鉴日本模式的基础上,以严重过失作为判断标准,将赔偿范围延伸至预期利益,同时允许股东会决议方式限免董事会责任,以促进公司利益与董事激励机制动态平衡。The Director's duty of diligence has always been an enduring topic.China's legislation does not clearly define the scope of directors'liability for compensation.In practice,there are some outstanding problems such as focusing on administrative liability,too narrow exemption situation,unclear compensation mechanism,etc.judicial decisions are mostly applicable to the provisions of tort law.Because directors'duty of diligence is different from ordinary duty of care,there are some defects in the principle of liability for compensation for infringement,such as lack of exemption situation,the wide standard of liability recovery,and too small compensation scope.From the perspective of comparative law,there are mainly American business autonomy mode,Japanese internal procedure control mode,and German tort liability mode.Based on the analysis of the ways to define the liability of directors in different legal areas,and on the basis of the model of Japan,this paper extends the scope of compensation to the expected interests by taking the gross negligence as the judgment standard,and at the same time allows the shareholders'meeting to decide to exempt the liability of the board of directors,so as to promote the dynamic balance between the interests of the company and the incentive mechanism of directors.

关 键 词：赔偿责任 注意义务 商业自治 内部控制 商业判断 

分 类 号：DF411.91[政治法律—经济法学]