高管持股、经济政策不确定性与企业绿色投资  

Executive Shareholding,Economic Policy Uncertainty and Corporate Green Investment

作　　者：陈理 黄珺[1] 曹丰[1] 周忠宝[1] CHEN Li;HUANG Jun;CAO Feng;ZHOU Zhongbao(Business School, Hunan University, Changsha,Hunan 410082, China)

机构地区：[1]湖南大学工商管理学院,湖南长沙410082

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2021年第3期58-64,共7页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71672055,71972068);国家自然科学基金青年项目(71602053)。

摘　　要：选取2011-2017年我国沪深A股重污染行业上市公司作为研究样本,考察了高管持股对企业绿色投资的影响。研究发现:高管持股与企业绿色投资间呈现倒U型关系。即高管持股存在一个临界值,当低于临界值时,高管持股能够发挥利益协同效应,促进企业提高绿色投资;当高于临界值时,高管持股会引发壕沟防御效应,削弱企业绿色投资。进一步考察外部环境后发现,经济政策不确定下减少了高管持股对企业绿色投资的利益趋同效应,但政府环境规制下扩大了两者间的利益趋同效应。This paper analyzes the influence of executive ownership on enterprise green investment from the perspective of enterprise micro behavior.Research shows that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between executive ownership and corporate green investment.That is,there is a critical value of executive stock ownership.When it is lower than the critical value,executive stock ownership can play a synergistic effect of interests and promote enterprises to increase green investment;when it is higher than the critical value,executive stock ownership will cause moat defense effect and weaken corporate green investment.After further considering the external environment,it is found that economic policy uncertainty reduces the interest convergence effect of executive shareholding on corporate green investment,but government environmental regulation enlarges the interest convergence effect.

关 键 词：高管持股 企业绿色投资 经济政策不确定 政府环境规制 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]