基于MSLFC 法的水资源短缺区域水资源模糊合作大联盟收益分配研究  

Research on the income allocation of water resources fuzzy cooperation alliancein the regions short of water resources based on MSLFC method

作　　者：谭佳音 蒋大奎[2] Tan Jiayin;Jiang Dakui(School of Business,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,China;College of Management and Economics,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China)

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学商学院,江苏南京211815 [2]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《江苏科技信息》2021年第13期62-69,共8页Jiangsu Science and Technology Information

基　　金：江苏省自然科学基金项目,项目名称:跨区域输水工程水源区生态补偿关键技术研究,项目编号:BK20140762;中国博士后基金面上项目,项目名称:电商平台参与下的品牌商全渠道零售定价与订单履行协同决策研究,项目编号:2020M670662。

摘　　要：对于水资源短缺区域中部门间水资源模糊合作博弈情况下的最优联盟用水收益分配问题,现有研究多侧重对最优联盟为多个模糊小联盟时的情况进行探讨,并且现有的联盟收益分配方法的分配结果并不能保证模糊合作博弈下大联盟的稳定。文章着重研究部门间大联盟为最优联盟时的联盟用水收益分配问题:由于联盟分配方法的选择与联盟支付函数形式有关,文章首先构建水资源短缺区域内部门间水资源合作联盟的支付函数及模糊合作博弈模型,以获得大联盟用水收益水平,及大联盟收益分配时所需的各小联盟收益计算方式;其次,基于联盟稳定的个体理性和集体理性约束,提出模糊合作博弈下实现大联盟稳定的3个必要条件,并提出改良最小强模糊核心收益分配方法(MSLFC法)、证明基于该方法的分配能满足3个必要条件且确保大联盟稳定;最后,基于伊朗Khuzestan地区的农业、工业部门间水资源合作实例,对文章提出的MSLFC法有效性进行了验证。In the case of fuzzy cooperative game of water resources between departments in the regions short of water resources,the current research focuses on the situation when the optimal alliance is multi-fuzzy small alliance,and the distribution results of the existing methods cannot guarantee the stability of the large alliance under fuzzy cooperative game.This paper focuses on the allocation of water income of inter-department alliance when the inter-department alliance is the best.Because the choice of the allocation method of the alliance is related to the form of the alliance payment function,this paper first constructs the payment function and fuzzy cooperation game model of the interdepartment cooperation alliance of water resources in the region of water shortage,in order to obtain the level of water income of the inter-department alliance and the calculation method of the income of each small alliance needed in the allocation of the income of the inter-department alliance.Secondly,based on the individual rational and collective rational constraints of alliance stability,three necessary conditions to realize the stability of big alliance under fuzzy cooperative game are put forward,and an improved minimum strong-epsilon fuzzy core income distribution method(MSLFC method)is proposed.Finally,based on the example of water resources cooperation between agriculture and industry in Khuzestan region of Iran,the validity of MSLFC method is verified.

关 键 词：水资源合作 模糊合作博弈 大联盟 联盟收益分配 MSLFC法 

分 类 号：TV213[水利工程—水文学及水资源]