社会资本是否促进了腐败--基于实验经济学的分析  

Does Social Capital Induce Corruption:Based on Experimental Economics

作　　者：陈叶烽[1] 卢露 罗干松 潘意文 陈易 CHEN Yefeng;LU Lu;LUO Gansong;PAN Yiwen;CHEN Yi(School of Economics,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou Zhejiang 310058,China;Warwick Business School,The University of Warwick,Coventry CV47AL,U.K.)

机构地区：[1]浙江大学经济学院,浙江杭州310058 [2]华威大学华威商学院,英国考文垂CV47AL

出　　处：《北京航空航天大学学报（社会科学版）》2021年第3期32-46,共15页Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics：Social Sciences edition Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71773111,71403242);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金。

摘　　要：基于实验室实验探究社会资本对腐败的影响,通过信任水平衡量社会资本,并引入道德成本和组别差异探究抑制腐败的机理。实验包括信任触发和贿赂博弈两部分,其中信任触发实验用于触发不同的信任水平,贿赂博弈实验用于测量腐败程度。此外,在贿赂博弈中分别加入道德成本和组别差异因素,通过负外部性和分组实现。结果表明,信任水平的提高会促进腐败程度的增加。其中,在低信任水平下道德成本和组别差异对腐败的抑制作用最显著;而在高信任水平下道德成本和组别差异的抑制作用被抵消。另外,分组设置对企业腐败行为的抑制更有效,而负外部性设置对官员腐败行为的抑制更有效。Based on a laboratory experiment,this paper studies the influence of social capital on corruption.We measure social capital through trust level and introduce moral costs and group differences to explore the mechanism of suppressing corruption.The experiment includes two parts:trust trigger and bribery game.The experiment of trust trigger is used for triggering different trust level,and the experiment of bribery game is used for measuring the extent of corruption.Implemented by negative externality and grouping respectively,we introduce moral cost and group difference into bribery game.Results show that the increasing of trust level could deepen the extent of corruption.The effect of moral cost and group difference in deterring corruption is significant under low trust level;however,the deterrence of moral cost and group difference is offset by high trust level.Furthermore,grouping is more effective for deterring firm’s corrupt behavior,and negative externality is more effective for deterring official’s corrupt behavior.

关 键 词：社会资本 腐败 信任水平 道德成本 组别差异 

分 类 号：D630.9[政治法律—政治学] F069.9[政治法律—中外政治制度]