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作 者:吴家麒 李翔[1] WU Jiaqi;LI Xiang(School of Economics and Management,Southwest University of Science and Technology,Mianyang 621010,China)
机构地区:[1]西南科技大学经济管理学院,四川绵阳621010
出 处:《物流科技》2021年第6期47-52,共6页Logistics Sci-Tech
摘 要:为治理中小物流企业联盟中存在的机会主义行为,分析其形成机理后,根据联盟动机对盟员企业进行了内生型和外生型的识别与区分;其次,设置相关影响参数并构建演化博弈模型;最后利用数值仿真法分别对各影响参数进行讨论。结果表明:资源共享水平、业务协作、信息共享与信任程度及惩戒罚金数值对治理盟员企业的机会主义行为具有正向影响;合作成本投入、投机收益与监管成本占比对治理盟员企业的机会主义行为具有反向影响。In order to govern the opportunistic behavior in the alliance of small and medium-sized logistics enterprises,after analyzing its formation mechanism,the“endogenous”and“exogenous”types of alliance enterprises are identified and distinguished according to the alliance motivation.Then the relevant influence parameters are set up and the evolution game model of alliance of small and medium-sized logistics enterprises is constructed.Finally,the influence parameters are discussed by numerical simulation.The results show that the level of resource sharing,business collaboration,information sharing and trust,and fine have positive effects on the opportunistic behavior of the governance alliance enterprises,and the proportion of cooperation cost input,speculative income and supervision cost has negative effects on the opportunistic behavior of the governance alliance enterprises.
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