基于特许期调整的城市污水处理PPP项目再谈判博弈研究  

Research on the Renegotiation Game of Urban Sewage Treatment PPP Project for Concession Period Adjustment

作　　者：程敏[1] 刘亚群 CHENG Min;LIU Ya-qun(School of Management,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444)

机构地区：[1]上海大学管理学院,上海200444

出　　处：《软科学》2021年第5期117-122,137,共7页Soft Science

基　　金：上海市哲学社会科学规划项目(2016BGL008)。

摘　　要：首先,基于实物期权构建PPP项目价值评估模型,用以确定项目未来价值,明确项目特许期调整区间;接着,考虑再谈判双方压力因子的不同以及谈判破裂的可能性,建立非对称压力讨价还价博弈模型;最后,以某污水处理项目为例进行模型应用分析。结果表明,非对称信息下,参与再谈判的双方收益不确定,社会资本在谈判中存在“先发制人”优势,政府可通过释放谈判信号获得优势,双方的心理状态也会影响再谈判的博弈结果,政府谈判采取“对半砍价”策略较为有利。This paper constructs a value evaluation model for PPP projects based on real option to determine the future value of the project and the adjustment interval of the project concession period.And then,it establishes an asymmetric pressure bargaining game model by considering the different pressure factors of the public sector and the private sector in the renegotiation and the possibility of negotiation breakdown.Finally,it takes a sewage treatment PPP project as an exmple to demonstrate the merit of the proposed model.Results show that benefits of both sectors involved in the renegotiation are uncertain when information is asymmetric.The private sector has preemptive advantage while the government can gain advantage by releasing the false negotiation signal.The psychological state can also affect the final game result of the renegotiation.It is more favorable for the government to adopt a"half-price bargaining"negotiation strategy.

关 键 词：PPP项目 再谈判 特许期调整 实物期权 讨价还价博弈 

分 类 号：F283[经济管理—国民经济] F294