非对称信息下的政府研发资助策略  

Government R&D Funding Strategy Under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：孙雅慧 罗守贵[1,2] Sun Yahui;Luo Shougui(Antai College of Economics and Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China;China Institute for Urban Governance,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China)

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030 [2]上海交通大学中国城市治理研究院,上海200030

出　　处：《中国科技论坛》2021年第6期28-37,53,共11页Forum on Science and Technology in China

基　　金：上海市软科学重点课题“关于科技奖励评价指标体系修改和完善的研究”(19692110600);上海市软科学重点课题“基于世界知识竞争力评价的上海知识竞争力演化研究”(20692180400)。

摘　　要：企业在申请研发资助的过程中可能会通过策略性创新释放虚假信号,将自身伪装成高创新能力企业,而处于信息劣势的政府难以识别其真伪。本文考虑这种逆向选择行为,构建一个包含创新引领者和创新追随者的两阶段模型,探究企业进行策略性创新的条件并提出两种政府应对措施,即信号甄别和差异化资助。结果表明:在不完全信息下,高研发资助鼓励创新追随者开展策略性创新。两种应对措施中,信号甄别仅能限制却无法消除策略性行为,而差异化资助则打破了策略性创新条件,鼓励创新追随者开展实质性创新。因此,在政府信号甄别精确度不高的情况下,实施差异化资助是更好的选择。In the process of applying for the government R&D funding,enterprises may send false signals through strategic innovation activities,disguising themselves as enterprises with high innovative ability.It is difficult for the government with information disadvantage to identify the authenticity.Focusing on this adverse selection behavior,this paper constructs a two-stage model including innovation leaders and innovation followers,explores the strategic innovation of enterprises,and proposes two countermeasures of signal screening and differentiated funding.The results show that high R&D funding encourages innovation followers to carry out strategic innovation under incomplete information.In the two countermeasures,signal screening can only limit,but cannot remove the strategic behavior,while differentiated funding completely breaks the conditions for innovation followers to carry out substantive innovation.

关 键 词：政府研发资助 信息不对称 策略性创新 信号甄别 差异化资助 

分 类 号：F204[经济管理—国民经济]