中小银行大股东治理与银行风险--一个文献综述  

Large Shareholder Governance and Bank Risk of Small and Medium Sized Banks:A Literature Review

作　　者：祝红梅[1] 郑六江[2] Zhu Hongmei;Zheng Liujiang

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行金融研究所,北京100033 [2]中国人民银行贵阳中心支行,贵州贵阳550001

出　　处：《金融理论与实践》2021年第6期32-38,共7页Financial Theory and Practice

摘　　要：防范大股东道德风险是中小银行治理需要关注的重要问题。通过梳理中小银行大股东治理风险相关文献,从银行业特殊性、股东治理的风险、如何防范大股东治理风险等方面总结其中的主要观点与结论。银行业特殊性使得大股东承担风险意愿较强,且可能直接“掏空”银行。银行公司治理机制间相互影响,银行监管是银行整体治理机制的重要组成部分,对银行整体治理效果有重要影响。因此,防范中小银行大股东道德风险,需要从强化监管、形成良好的股权结构、影响大股东风险承担意愿、限制可能的“掏空”行为等方面进行综合考虑。我国中小银行类型较多,对各类银行机构存在的主要问题,要针对性弥补治理短板,综合考虑整体治理机制对大股东的激励约束作用,有效防范大股东道德风险。It is an important issue for small and medium-sized banks to prevent the moral hazard of large shareholders. This paper reviews the literature on the governance risk of large shareholders in small and medium-sized banks, and summarizes the main views and conclusions from the aspects of the particularity of banking industry, the risk of shareholder governance, and how to prevent the risk of large shareholder governance. The particularity of the banking industry allows that large shareholders have a strong willingness to take risksand may directly"hollow out"the bank. Bank supervision is an important part of the overall governance mechanism of banks, which has an important impact on the overall governance effect of banks. Therefore, to prevent the moral hazard of large shareholders in small and medium-sized banks, we need to strengthen supervision, form a balanced equity structure, influence the risk-taking willingness of large shareholders, and limit the possible"tunneling"behavior.There are many types of small andmedium-sized banks in China,facing the main problems of all kinds of banking institutions, we should make up for the shortcomings ofgovernance, comprehensively consider the incentive and restraint effect of the overall governance mechanism on large shareholders, and prevent the moral hazard of large shareholderseffectively.

关 键 词：股东治理 中小银行 道德风险 内部控制 银行风险 

分 类 号：F832.3[经济管理—金融学]