公共部门绩效评估中的博弈行为:分类框架、识别策略与研究进路  

Gaming Behavior in Public Sector Performance Evaluation:Typology,Identification Strategies,and Future Directions

作　　者：李佳源 Jiayuan Li

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学公共管理学院

出　　处：《公共行政评论》2021年第3期176-195,200,共21页Journal of Public Administration

摘　　要：政府绩效评估已成为公共管理研究的重要主题,但相当部分的文献仍然受到工具理性话语的主导,侧重于评估体系的构建和对评估价值的规范讨论。这些研究忽视了评估的“黑暗面”(Grizzle,2002),即绩效评估引入公共部门后诱发了评估对象的策略性回应及其他一系列非预期后果。基于对多学科实证研究的梳理和整合,论文聚焦发生于公共部门情境下的绩效评估博弈行为,尝试归纳这类行为的一般模式以及近年来文献在这一主题研究上取得的方法上的突破。在此基础上,笔者指出现有研究的三个主要缺陷和可能的研究进路:采用非介入性的方法测量博弈行为的普遍性、构建中层解释框架,以及从组织行为等相邻学科中获取概念和分析工具。Government performance measurement has become an important theme within public administration scholarship. Nevertheless,the discussion around this theme continues to be dominated by the discourse of instrumental rationality,with the focus confined to the construction of measurement systems and their normative values. We argue the extant literature neglects the dark side of performance measurement,that is,the strategic responses from those subjected to performance measurement. After synthesizing empirical studies from multiple disciplines,we investigate behaviors in the public sector to inductively derive the general patterns of gaming. We summarize the methodological breakthroughs found in recent scholarship. And,we discuss the limitations of these studies and highlight the promising directions for future research. These are: exploring unobtrusive methods to measure the prevalence of gaming behavior,building mid-range exploratory frameworks,and importing concepts and theories from neighboring disciplines.

关 键 词：绩效评估 博弈行为 公共部门 

分 类 号：D63[政治法律—政治学]