基于三方演化博弈的微网接入公共配电网服务输配电价调整监管机制  

The Regulatory Mechanism of Microgrid Access to Public Distribution Network Service Transmission and Distribution Price Adjustment Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game

作　　者：谢敬东 卞泽远 吕志伟 孙波 XIE Jing-dong;BIAN Ze-yuan;LÜZhi-wei;SUN Bo(Energy and Power Science and Technology Center, Shanghai University of Electric Power, Shanghai 200082, China;College of Economics and Management, Shanghai University of Electric Power, Shanghai 200082, China)

机构地区：[1]上海电力大学能源电力科创中心,上海200082 [2]上海电力大学经济与管理学院,上海200082

出　　处：《科学技术与工程》2021年第15期6312-6321,共10页Science Technology and Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(51507099);教育部人文社会科学研究基金(15YJCZH147);上海市经济和信息化委员会科研项目(20200606)。

摘　　要：在电力市场环境下,由于“吸脂效应”的存在,电网企业利润减少,微网接入公共配电网服务的微利性使得服务质量存在大幅下降的风险,迫切需要制定相应的价格激励及监管机制。从实际监管场景出发,运用演化博弈理论构建了监管机构、电网公司和微网三方博弈模型,通过支付函数建立了三方复制动态方程和雅各比矩阵,研究了各博弈主体博弈策略的关联性以及渐进稳定性结论,最后通过对渐进稳定性判据对应的各参数进行赋值,使用MATLAB软件对博弈模型进行仿真分析。仿真结果表明,准许收益、罚款、微网主动参与监管成本与电网公司运营费用是影响服务质量演化博弈渐进稳定状态的主要影响因素,适当提高准许收益与罚款,电网企业加大创新管理水平,有助于减少监管成本,促进接入服务质量提高,实现社会福利最大化。最后,提出3个建议,为政府决策和电力监管提供参考。In the electricity market environment,due to the existence of the“cream skimming”,the profits of power grid companies have decreased,and the meager profitability of microgrid access to the public distribution network service is a public power service has caused the risk of substantial decline in service quality.Corresponding price incentives and regulatory mechanisms urgently need to be formulated.Starting from actual supervision scenarios,evolutionary game theory was applied to construct a tripartite game model of regulators,grid companies and microgrids.The three-party replication dynamic equation and Jacobian matrix were built through the payment function,and the relevance of each game player's game strategy and the conclusion of gradual stability were studied,and at last,the parameters corresponding to the asymptotic stability criterion been assigned,the game model was simulated and analyzed by MATLAB.The simulation results is concluded that the allowable income,fines,the cost of microgrid active participation in supervision and the operating expenses of grid companies are the main influencing factors that affect the evolutionary game of service quality and the gradual stability of the game.If the allowable income and fines are increased appropriately,and the innovation management level of grid enterprises has been effectively improved,supervision costs will be effectively reduced,access service quality will be effectively improved,and social welfare will be maximized.Finally,three suggestions were put forward to provide reference for government decision-making and power regulation.

关 键 词：接入服务 吸脂效应 输配电价调整 三方演化博弈 渐进稳定性 

分 类 号：TM715[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]