不同担保模式下考虑零售商公平关切的闭环供应链博弈模型  

Game models of closed-loop supply chain under different warranty modes considering retailer’s fairness concerns

作　　者：马晓平[1] 刘志[1,2] 李帮义 唐娟[1] 郑小雪 MA Xiao-ping;LIU Zhi;LI Bang-yi;TANG Juan;ZHENG Xiao-xue(College of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing 210016,China;College of Management Engineering,Anhui Polytechnic University,Wuhu 241001,China;College of Transportation and Civil Engineering,Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,Fuzhou 350002,China)

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,南京210016 [2]安徽工程大学管理工程学院,安徽芜湖241001 [3]福建农林大学交通与土木工程学院,福州350002

出　　处：《控制与决策》2021年第6期1489-1498,共10页Control and Decision

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71801003,71901002);教育部人文社科青年项目(18YJC630110);安徽省高校优秀青年人才支持计划项目(gxyqZD2019048);福建省科技计划项目(2019J05049)。

摘　　要：针对由一个制造商和一个零售商构成的闭环供应链,运用Stackelberg动态博弈理论,构建不同担保模式下考虑零售商公平关切的决策博弈模型,探讨产品担保模式及零售商公平关切对闭环供应链定价及担保期决策、经济效益和环境效益的影响,分析不同担保模式的担保效率.研究结果表明:当消费者对新产品和再制造品差异化担保期较为敏感时,制造商或零售商会为再制造品提供长期担保服务;零售商公平关切会降低新产品和再制造品批发价格,其对再制造品销售价格、担保期以及供应链经济环境效益的影响与产品担保模式密切相关;两种担保模式的经济环境效益与担保成本和再制造品相对环境优势相关,当零售商担保的相对成本优势和再制造品相对环境优势显著(微弱)时,零售商(制造商)担保模式是闭环供应链利益相关者的一致选择;零售商担保模式能够减缓零售商公平关切对闭环供应链经济效益及环境效益的负面影响.In a closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, we construct the decisionmaking game model by considering fairness concerns under different warranty modes. The impact of warranty modes and retailer’s fairness concerns on CLSC pricing and warranty period decisions as well as the economic and environmental benefit is discussed, and the warranty efficiency of different warranty models is analyzed. The results show that when consumers are more sensitive to different warranty periods between new and remanufactured products, manufacturers or retailers will provide long-term warranty services for remanufactured products;retailers’ fairness concerns will reduce the wholesale prices of both the new and remanufactured products;the impact of the fairness concerns on the sale price and warranty period of remanufactured products and the economic and environmental benefits of the supply chain are closely related to different product warranty modes. The economic and environmental benefits of the two warranty modes are contingent on the warranty costs and the relative environmental advantages of the remanufactured products. When the relative cost advantage of retailer warranty and the relative environmental advantage of remanufactured products are significant(weak), the retailer(manufacturer) warranty mode is the consistent decision made by stakeholders in the CLSC. The retailer warranty model can reduce the negative impact of retailer’s fairness concerns on the economic and environmental benefits of the CLSC.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 再制造 担保模式 公平关切 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F253[经济管理—国民经济]