经济学视域下行政执法与刑事司法衔接互动之分析  

On the Interaction between Administrative Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice from the Perspective of Economics

作　　者：逄晓枫[1] 张建国 Pang Xiaofeng;Zhang Jianguo

机构地区：[1]青岛大学法学院,山东青岛266000 [2]长春人文学院法学院,吉林长春130000

出　　处：《行政与法》2021年第5期114-120,共7页Administration and Law

基　　金：2019年山东省社会科学规划审判研究专题“食品安全犯罪行刑衔接制度研究”的阶段性成果,项目编号:19BSPJ05。

摘　　要：在经济学视野下,行刑衔接是一种双方互动的关系,必须解决二者间的协调与合作问题,以实现整体利益最大化。基于"智猪博弈"模型,应当充分考虑利用激励措施以促进行政机关对于涉罪案件的移送。按照"成本-收益"的决策思维,公安机关应当承担主观方面的事实证明责任。从供需法则的角度来看,适当降低行政机关移送涉罪案件的证明标准能够更好地衔接刑事司法。对于行刑衔接互动之间存在的信息不对称问题,应强化检察机关作为第三方主体的监督职能。In the economic perspective,execution linkag e is an interactive relationship between the two sides.The coordination and cooperation between the two must be solved to maximize the overall interests.Based on the"game of smart pigs"model,we should fully consider the use of incentives to promote the transfer of crime cases by administrative organs.According to the thinking mode of"cost benefit",the public security organ should bear the subjective burden of proof of fact.From the perspective of supply and demand law,it is better to reduce the standard of proof of transfer of crime cases by administrative organs.For the information asymmetry between execution and execution,the supervision function of the procuratorial organ of the third party should be strengthened.

关 键 词：行刑衔接 囚徒困境 TFT 智猪博弈 “成本-收益”分析 

分 类 号：D922.4[政治法律—法学]