植物品种权资本化运营合作策略分析--基于演化博弈模型及仿真  

Analysis of Capitalization Operation Cooperative Strategy of Plant Variety Rights:Based on Evolutionary Game Model and Simulation

作　　者：赵雅婷 周衍平[1] ZHAO Ya-ting;ZHOU Yan-ping(College of Economics and Management,Shandong University of Science and Technology,Qingdao Shandong 266590,China)

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学经济管理学院,山东青岛266590

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2021年第6期78-83,共6页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(17BJY129);山东省自然科学基金项目(ZR2017MG023)。

摘　　要：植物品种权资本化运营是中国品种权创新发展的重要突破。为激发农业科技创新的热情,文章从植物品种权资本化运营的主体行为出发,构建演化博弈模型,对投资方与科研方演化路径和影响因素进行研究。结果表明:品种权资本化运营受利益分配系数的影响,存在最优利益分配系数从而使各主体的参与积极性最大,合作成本、风险过高会阻碍投资方与科研方之间的合作,违约惩罚、政府补贴对品种权的资本化运营具有正向促进作用。投资方、科研方和政府等机构需要根据品种权资本化运营的影响因素采取相应的措施,以期为我国植物品种权资本化运营的实践探索提供理论依据。The capitalized operation of Plant Variety Rights(PVRs)is an important breakthrough in the innovation and development of it.In order to stimulate the enthusiasm of agricultural technology innovation,this paper embarks from the capitalized operator behavior of PVRs,building the evolutionary game model of capitalization operation,and exploring the evolution path and factors of investors and researchers.The results show that the capitalization operation of PVRs is affected by the benefit distribution coefficient.The optimal benefit distribution coefficient maximizes the enthusiasm of each subject.The cooperation cost and risks are too high to hinder the cooperation between the investors and researchers.Penalties for breach of contract and government subsidies have a positive effect on the capitalization of PVRs.Investment and research entities,government and other institutions need to take corresponding measures based on the influencing factors of PVRs capitalization operations,in order to provide a theoretical basis for the exploration of PVRs capitalization operations.

关 键 词：植物品种权 资本化运营 合作策略 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F302.6[经济管理—产业经济]