高校毕业生就业政策执行中的委托代理问题及其治理  

The Principal-Agent Problem and Its Governance in the Implementation of Employment Policy for College Graduates

作　　者：黄彩霞 陈兴明 HUANG Cai-xia;CHEN Xing-ming

机构地区：[1]福州大学经济与管理学院,福建福州350100

出　　处：《中国大学生就业》2021年第11期34-40,共7页China University Students Career Guide

摘　　要：高校毕业生就业政策执行活动实质上是一种基于委托代理关系的契约行为。研究表明,高校毕业生就业政策执行中存在着以逆向选择和道德风险为代表的委托代理问题,从而降低高校毕业生就业政策执行的有效性。该问题主要源于政策执行过程中委托人与代理人之间的信息不对称、激励不相容和监督不到位。通过促进政策执行信息共享,增加执行过程信息透明度;注重政策执行目标激励,化解执行过程的利益分歧;健全政策执行监管机制,提高执行过程的违约成本等措施,可以有效治理高校毕业生就业政策执行中存在的委托代理问题。Abstrac The implementation of employment policy for college graduates is essentially a contractual behavior based on principal-agent relationship.The research shows that there are principal-agent problems such as adverse selection and moral hazard in the implementation of college graduates'employment policy,which reduces the effectiveness of the implementation of college graduates'employment policy.This problem is mainly due to the asymmetric information between the principal and agent in the process of policy implementation,incentive incompatibility and inadequate supervision.By promoting the information sharing of policy implementation,increasing the information transparency of the implementation process,paying attention to the incentive of policy implementation objectives,resolving the interest differences in the implementation process,improving the supervision mechanism of policy implementation,and increasing the cost of breach of contract in the implementation process,we can effectively deal with the principal-agent problems existing in the implementation of college graduates'employment policy.

关 键 词：高校毕业生就业政策 政策执行 委托代理问题 

分 类 号：G640[文化科学—高等教育学]