基于演化博弈的PPP项目研究  

Research on PPP Project Based on Evolutionary Game

作　　者：孙翔 罗智骁 SUN Xiang;LUO Zhi-xiao(Department of Economics and Management,North China Electric Power University,Baoding 071003,China)

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学经济管理系,保定071003

出　　处：《价值工程》2021年第15期42-43,共2页Value Engineering

摘　　要：PPP项目中,政府部门代理人与私营企业会经济租金产生寻租行为,为了保障民生,监管部门需要对PPP项目进行监管。文章经过演化博弈模型分析,得出可能影响监管部门和寻租部门最终策略选择的变量为:成功稽查寻租行为的概率θ,稽查成本k,以及对寻租双方的惩罚力度α、β,减少寻租行为可以从上述参数入手。In PPP projects,government agency agents and private companies will generate rent-seeking behaviors based on economic rents.In order to protect people's livelihood,regulatory agencies need to supervise PPP projects.After analyzing the evolutionary game model,the article concludes that the variables that may affect the final strategy choice of the supervisory department and the rent-seeking department are:the probability of successfully inspecting rent-seeking behaviorθ,the audit cost k,and the punishment for both rent-seeking partiesα、β.For reducing rent-seeking behavior,we can start with the above parameters.

关 键 词：经济租金 寻租行为 有限理性 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F287.8[经济管理—国民经济]