基于监督博弈的铁路公益性货运产品补贴机制研究  

A Study on Subsidy Mechanism of Railway Public-welfare Freight Transportation Based on Supervision Game

作　　者：郭利田 武晓亮 李悦 李红利 GUO Litian;WU Xiaoliang;LI Yue;LI Hongli(Transportation&Economics Research Institute,China Academy of Railway Sciences Corporation Limited,Beijing 100081,China;Ministry of Materials and Equipment,China State Railway Group Co.,Ltd.,Beijing 100844,China)

机构地区：[1]中国铁道科学研究院集团有限公司运输及经济研究所,北京100081 [2]中国国家铁路集团有限公司物资部,北京100844

出　　处：《科技与经济》2021年第3期86-90,共5页Science & Technology and Economy

基　　金：中国国家铁路集团有限公司科技研究计划课题——“和谐机车修程修制优化经济评价”(项目编号K2020J011,项目负责人:付建飞)成果之一;中国铁道科学研究院集团有限公司科研项目——“国铁企业股份制改造基本方案研究”(项目编号2019YJ141,项目负责人:罗庆中)成果之一。

摘　　要：铁路承担着大量公益性货物运输任务,然而相关管理部门及学术研究并未给予足够重视。目前,铁路公益性货物运输产品范围尚未明确界定,铁路货运亏损测算标准和补贴机制尚处于理论探讨阶段。首先从军特专运、紧急求援物资、涉农物资等角度界定铁路公益性货物运输产品的范围,建立亏损测算模型;然后借鉴博弈论理论知识,构建监督机构与铁路企业博弈模型,基于均衡结果探析铁路公益性货物运输产品亏损补贴机制,提出建立铁路公益性货物运输产品补贴机制需要注意的关键问题。A large number of public-welfare freight is transported by railway.However,management authorities and scholars have not paid enough attention to it.At present,the scope of railway public-welfare freight has not been clearly defined,the calculation standard and subsidy mechanism for losses in railway transportation are still in the stage of theoretical discussion.This paper defines the scope of railway public-welfare freight from the perspectives of military special transportation,emergency aid materials and agricultural materials,and constructs calculation models of losses,then sets up a game model of supervision authorities and railway enterprises by borrowing the game theory,and designs subsidy mechanism of railway public-welfare freight based on the equilibrium outcome.Finally,this paper puts forward the key issues of establishing the subsidy mechanism of railway public-welfare freight.

关 键 词：监督博弈 铁路公益性货运 亏损测算模型 补贴机制 

分 类 号：F532[经济管理—产业经济] F812.45