当代银行挤兑理论与模型研究述评  

A Survey of Contemporary Bank Run Theory and Model Studies

作　　者：张云[1] 刘帅光[1] 李宝伟[1] 王壬玚 Zhang Yun;Liu Shuaiguang;Li Baowei;Wang Renyang

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济学院,天津300071 [2]云南大学经济学院,昆明650500

出　　处：《经济问题探索》2021年第6期173-178,共6页Inquiry Into Economic Issues

基　　金：天津市教委社科重大项目“借助企业国际合作创新动能,促进天津市产业高质量发展研究”(ZB19500608),项目负责人:蒋雅文。

摘　　要：随着金融创新的不断发展以及影子银行的迅速崛起,银行挤兑再度成为经济学讨论热点。本文梳理了20世纪80年代以来有关银行挤兑理论的两大学说以及理论模型,从源头分析银行挤兑的内在原因及其作用机制。研究发现:(1)银行挤兑危机归根结底是由于金融机构资产负债表中的流动性错配,当某一时点上银行的流动性需求超过其短期资产价值时,挤兑就有可能发生;(2)银行挤兑危机的防范政策上以存款保险制度、流动性供应以及资本金管制为主。这三项政策形成了一套相对完整的体系,其通过保障存款人的利益及对金融中介提供流动性支持降低了挤兑风险,本文的研究为我国将来如何有效防范金融机构的挤兑风险提供了理论支持。With the continuous development of financial innovation and the rapid rise of shadow banking,bank runs have become a hot topic in economics.This paper sorts out two theories and theoretical models of bank run since 1980 s,and analyzes the internal causes and mechanism of bank run from the source.It is found that:(1)the bank run crisis is due to the liquidity mismatch in financial institutions’balance sheets in the final analysis.When the liquidity demand of banks exceeds the value of their short-term assets at a certain point,a bank run may occur.(2)the prevention policy of bank runs is mainly based on deposit insurance system,liquidity supply and capital control.These three policies gradually formed a relatively complete system,by protecting the interests of depositors and providing liquidity support to financial institutions,greatly reducing the risk of bank runs.However,the current regulatory policy is not perfect,the risk of a run on financial institutions still exist.How to control the risk of bank run effectively through policy innovation is still an important problem that we need to think about and solve urgently.

关 键 词：银行挤兑 金融恐慌 经济周期 流动性错配 

分 类 号：F830.2[经济管理—金融学]