PPP:社会监督、外部规制与最优激励合同设计  

PPP: Social Monitoring, External Regulation and the Design of Optimal Incentive Contract

作　　者：刘穷志[1] 张莉莎 QIONGZHI LIU;LISHA ZHANG(Wuhan University)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院 [2]武汉大学政治与公共管理学院,湖北省武汉市430072

出　　处：《经济学（季刊）》2021年第3期999-1022,共24页China Economic Quarterly

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目“PPP(公私合作伙伴)中财政资金引导私人资本作用机制创新研究”(14ZDA029)的支持。

摘　　要：本文从最优激励合同设计的角度出发,试图分析社会监督在PPP监管和项目公司努力水平等方面发挥的作用。研究发现,将社会监督因素写入最优激励合同,能够有效提高合同的激励强度和项目公司的努力水平,社会监督通过声誉机制和行政治理机制发挥作用,并与政府监管之间存在正向的促进互补关系。这表明应建立起政府监管和社会监督优势互补的双重外部规制机制,并从政策层面鼓励社会公众积极监督PPP项目的执行。This study begins with the design of optimal incentive contract,tries to analyze the effect of social monitoring to PPP supervision and SPV.The study finds out that introducing social monitoring into optimal incentive contract improves the effort level of SPV and the incentive intensity of the contract,with the help of reputation mechanism and governance mechanism,a forward complementary relationship exists between social monitoring and government supervision.It is necessary to establish a dual external regulation system with the complementary advantages of social monitoring and government supervision,while to encourage public to monitor the operation of PPP project.

关 键 词：PPP模式 社会监督 最优激励 

分 类 号：F283[经济管理—国民经济]