基于风险偏好和公平偏好的PPP项目政府补偿机制研究  

Government Compensation Mechanism for PPP Based onRisk Preference and Fairness Preference

作　　者：高华[1] 侯晓轩[1] 张新鑫[1] GAO Hua;HOU Xiao-xuan;ZHANG Xin-xin(School of Management,Tianjin University of Technology,Tianjin 300384,China)

机构地区：[1]天津理工大学管理学院,天津300384

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2021年第6期191-197,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71471131);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(20A10060007);天津市艺术科学规划项目(D20015)。

摘　　要：本文在综合考虑社会资本风险偏好和公平偏好的基础上,构建了政府与社会资本之间的Stackelberg博弈模型,分析了社会资本风险偏好和公平偏好影响下PPP项目政府补偿机制的最优设计。研究表明:社会资本的最优投资水平随风险规避度的增高而降低,随公平偏好程度的增高而增高;政府补偿机制的最优设计应是在考虑单期风险及公平溢价成本的基础上,估计单期期望运营收益的高低,进而协调年建设成本补偿及运营期补偿系数两者的相对关系,设计最优的年建设成本补偿和运营期补偿系数。Based on the comprehensive consideration of the risk preference and fairness preference of social capital,this paper constructs a Stackelberg game model between government and social capital,to analyzes the optimum design of government compensation mechanism under the influence of risk preference and fairness preference.The research shows that the optimal investment level of social capital is negatively correlated with risk preference and positively correlated with the degree of fairness preference.The optimal design of the government compensation mechanism should be based on the consideration of the single-phase the risk and the fair premium cost,and the government should estimate the relative operating profit of the single-phase,and then coordinate the annual construction cost compensation and the operating period compensation coefficient to design optimal annual construction cost compensation and the optimal operating period compensation coefficient.

关 键 词：PPP项目 政府补偿机制 公平偏好 风险偏好 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F294[经济管理—国民经济]