城市商业银行市场退出的法律规制——谦抑干预视角的思考  

Legal Regulation of City Commercial Banks’Market Exit from the Perspective of Modest Intervention

作　　者：杨子谊 YANG Zi-yi(School of Law,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan,430073,China)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学法学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《湖北工业职业技术学院学报》2021年第3期41-46,共6页Journal of Hubei Industrial Polytechnic

摘　　要：城市商业银行的市场退出伴随着诸多风险挑战,须经由完善的法律规则体系予以应对与化解。时下,我国城市商业银行市场退出规则已较具规模,相关规则已于实践中得到运用,但实践结果亦显示出这些规则存在的纰漏。既行规制理念下政府干预不适当是纰漏产生的主要原因,对规则予以的学理解读也直接表明规制理念向谦抑干预转变的优化需求。作为一种规制理念,谦抑干预意味着充分尊重市场机制作用下,对政府干预予以适当地规范化。存款保障规则与注销登记规则是我国城市商业银行市场退出制度中的主要规则,分属实体性规则与程序性规则范畴。The market exit of city commercial banks is accompanied by many risks,which should be dealt with and resolved by a perfect legal system.At present,a certain number of city commercial banks in China exit from the market,and the rules are applied in practice,but the practical results show that there are some flaws in these rules.The inappropriate government intervention under the existing regulation concept is the main reason for the flaws.The theoretical interpretation of the rules also directly shows the optimization needs of the transformation from government intervention to modest intervention.As a concept of regulation,modest intervention means fully respecting the market mechanism and properly standardizing government intervention.Guarantee rules and deregistration rules are the main ones in the market exit system of China's city commercial banks,which are categorized as substantive rules and procedural rules.

关 键 词：市场退出制度 城市商业银行 谦抑干预 存款保障 注销登记 

分 类 号：D922.28[政治法律—经济法学]