惩罚机制下城市居民垃圾投放行为策略研究  

Study on the Strategy of Urban Residents'Garbage Delivery Behavior under the Punishment Mechanism

作　　者：张蓓佳[1] ZHANG Beijia(School of Management,Anhui University,Hefei 230601,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽大学管理学院,安徽合肥230601

出　　处：《经济与管理》2021年第4期47-55,共9页Economy and Management

基　　金：教育部人文社科项目(18YJC630274)。

摘　　要：当前在垃圾分类试点城市中,居民垃圾分类投放参与率相对较低。为了提高居民分类投放的积极性,通过构建居民和政府间的演化博弈模型,研究不同惩罚机制下的居民垃圾投放行为策略。研究表明:运用静态惩罚机制无法有效约束居民分类投放行为;而两种动态惩罚机制均能起到促进居民分类投放行为的作用,其中关联政府行为的动态惩罚机制相较于关联居民行为的动态惩罚机制,在促进居民分类投放和释放政府监管压力方面的效果更好。因此,惩罚机制应根据政府监管行为进行动态调整,提高惩罚上限和降低居民分类投放成本以降低政府监管概率和提高居民分类投放概率,此外降低监管成本对促进居民分类投放也有积极作用。At present,in the pilot cities of waste classification,the participation rate of residents in classified disposal is relatively low.To improve residents'positivity for waste classification,the paper studies behavioral strategies of urban residents'waste disposal under different punishment mechanisms respectively through constructing an evolutionary game model between residents and the government.The results show that:static punishment mechanism cannot effectively restrain residents'classified investment behavior,while the two dynamic punishment mechanisms can promote residents'classified investment behavior.The dynamic punishment mechanism related to government behavior is compared with the dynamic punishment mechanism related to residents'behavior.The former one is more effective in promoting the classified behavior of residents and releasing government supervision pressure.Therefore,the punishment mechanism should be adjusted dynamically according to the government's supervision behavior.And the upper limit of punishment should be increased and the classified investment cost of residents should be reduced to reduce the probability of government supervision and improve the probability of classified investment of residents.In addition,reducing the supervision cost will also play a positive role in promoting the classified investment of residents.

关 键 词：城市居民垃圾投放行为 惩罚机制 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F062.1[经济管理—政治经济学] X37[环境科学与工程—环境工程]