基于演化博弈的电商经济下的合谋伪评论研究  

Research on Collusion Fake Review in E-commerce Economy Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：赵静娴[1] 杨丽丽 倪春鹏 Zhao Jingxian;Yang Lili;Ni Chunpeng(College of Economics and Management,Tianjin University of Science&Technology,Tianjin 300222;Huahai Communication Technology Co.,Ltd,Tianjin 300457)

机构地区：[1]天津科技大学经管学院,天津300222 [2]华海通信技术有限公司,天津300457

出　　处：《情报探索》2021年第7期24-28,共5页Information Research

基　　金：天津科技大学青年教师创新基金项目(项目编号:2016ZD01)阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：[目的/意义]针对电商经济中好评返利等消费者与电商合谋进行伪评论进行研究,促进电商经济健康发展。[方法/过程]首先在理论分析的基础上给出了合谋伪评论的定义,然后构建了用户、商家、平台之间的三方演化博弈模型。[结果/结论]各干系方的策略选择受多种因素的共同影响,系统不会固定收敛于一个稳定状态。奖惩力度、监管成功率等因素会直接影响系统的演化方向。最后提出了抵制合谋伪评论的相应策略建议。[Purpose/significance]The paper conducts research on fake reviews on collusion between e-commerce and consumers such as good reviews and returns,to promote the healthy development of e-commerce economy.[Method/processes]Firstly,based on theoretical analysis,the definition of collusion fake review is given.Then,a three-party evolutionary game model among users,online merchants and platforms is constructed.[Results/conclusion]The strategy selection of each stakeholder is affected by many factors,and the system will not converge to a stable state.Factors such as reward-penalty intensity and regulatory success rate will directly affect the evolution direction of the system.Finally,it puts forward the corresponding strategic suggestions to resist collusion fake review.

关 键 词：合谋伪评论 演化博弈 电商伪评论 电商经济 

分 类 号：F49[经济管理—产业经济]