基于不同政策环境的“一带一路”电力工程安全投资决策演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Safety Investment in“The Belt and Road”Power Investment Project Based on Different Policy Environment

作　　者：杨太华 秦静 李志翔 YANG Taihua;QIN Jing;LI Zhixiang(School of Economic and Management,Shanghai University of Electric Power,Shanghai 200090,China)

机构地区：[1]上海电力大学经济与管理学院,上海200090

出　　处：《上海电力大学学报》2021年第4期373-379,共7页Journal of Shanghai University of Electric Power

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(17BGL010);上海市哲学社会科学基金(2016BGL001)。

摘　　要：随着“一带一路”和中国企业“走出去”战略的全面推进,境外能源电力投资项目的安全性受到多种风险因素的挑战。基于行为主体具有动机公平偏好的假设,将“一带一路”国家政府和投资企业定义为委托代理关系,建立了不同政策环境下能源电力工程安全投资博弈模型,并通过实证检验了提升项目安全保障水平的最佳投资决策机制。With the comprehensive promotion of the“The Belt and Road”Intiative and the“Going Global”strategy of Chinese enterprises,the security of overseas energy and power investment projects is challenged by various risk factors.Based on the assumption that the behavior subject has the motivation fairness preference,this paper defines the“Belt and Road”national government and investment enterprise as the principal-agent relationship,establishes the game model of investment project security investment under different policy risks and empirically testes the best decision-making mechanism for safety investment in improving project safety and security level.

关 键 词：政策环境 一带一路 电力工程项目 安全投资决策 博弈模型 

分 类 号：F426.61[经济管理—产业经济]