高峰期公交线路运营策略的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Bus Route Operation Strategy during Peak Hours

作　　者：吴亮 李引珍[1] WU Liang;LI Yin-zhen(School of Traffic and Transportation,Lanzhou Jiaotong University,Lanzhou 730070,China)

机构地区：[1]兰州交通大学交通运输学院,兰州730070

出　　处：《兰州交通大学学报》2021年第3期20-27,共8页Journal of Lanzhou Jiaotong University

基　　金：甘肃省高等学校创新基金(2020B-111);兰州交通大学青年科学基金(2019032)。

摘　　要：面向高峰时段,结合博弈论研究城市常规公交线路运营策略选择的内在机理,利用差异化的发车频率使出行者与公交运营者的利益达到均衡.首先建立出行者与公交运营者间的双方非对称演化博弈模型,计算双方的复制动态方程,利用复制动态相位图呈现各自策略选择的演化路径;接着通过构建双方共同参与的复制动态系统雅可比矩阵,研究相关平衡点的稳定性;最后分析了不同情形下的演化博弈稳定策略,并利用MATLAB软件进行了仿真分析.研究发现:系统演化路径的演变过程与鞍点位置有关,采取对博弈双方各自收益具有积极影响的运营策略能够加快演化博弈系统达到稳定策略的收敛速度.Based on the game theory,this paper studies the internal mechanism of the operation strategy selection of urban regular bus route in the face of peak hours,and uses the differentiated departure frequency to balance the interest of travelers and bus operators.First,an asymmetric evolutionary game model between travelers and bus operators is established and the replication dynamic equations of both parties is calculated,so that the evolution path of their respective strategy choices is represented by using the replication dynamic phase diagram.Then the Jacobian matrix of the replication dynamic system in which both parties participate together is built to study the stability of the relevant equilibrium points.Finally,the evolutionary game stability strategy under different conditions is analyzed,while the MATLAB software is used to carry out the simulation analysis.The results shows that the evolution process of the system evolution path is related to the position of the saddle point,and the adoption of an operation strategy that has a positive impact on the respective gains of both parties in the game can speed up the convergence speed of the evolutionary game system to the stable strategy.

关 键 词：公交线路 运营策略 发车频率 演化博弈 复制动态方程 

分 类 号：U492.22[交通运输工程—交通运输规划与管理]