转移支付与地方政府引资竞争  

Transfer Payment and Local Government’s Competition in Investment

作　　者：吴柏钧[1] 曹志伟 WU Bai-jun;CAO Zhi-wei(School of Business,East China University of Science and Technology,200237)

机构地区：[1]华东理工大学商学院,200237

出　　处：《上海经济研究》2021年第6期118-128,共11页Shanghai Journal of Economics

基　　金：上海市教育委员会科研创新计划项目“城市公共产品有效供给机制研究”(项目编号:2017-01-07-00-02-E00008)阶段性成果之一。

摘　　要：本文主要探讨中央纵向转移支付制度对地方政府引资竞争行为的影响。利用1994-2019年省级面板数据的实证研究表明,分税制实施以后,转移支付作为财政收入再分配机制发挥了一定的地区财政平衡作用。在既定财政体制下有效缓解了地方政府财政压力,对地方政府招商引资竞争行为产生了抑制效应,并呈现出具有异质性的区位效应、结构效应和规模效应。研究表明,在科层制结构下,中央政府通过转移支付流向、结构与规模的调整手段,一定程度上能够缓解地方政府财政压力,调整地区间的财政关系,改变区域经济竞争方式。This paper mainly discusses the influence of the central vertical transfer payment system on the local government’s competition in investment.An empirical study using provincial panel data from 1994 to 2019 shows that after the implementation of tax-sharing systerm,transfer payments have played a certain role in regional fiscal balance as a fiscal revenue redistribution mechanism.Under the established fiscal system,it effectively alleviates the fiscal pressure of local governments,produces a restraining effect on the competition behavior of local governments in attracting investment,and shows heterogeneous location effects,structural effects and scale effects.Studies have shown that under the bureaucratic structure,the central government can ease the fiscal pressure of local governments to a certain extent by adjusting the flow,structure and scale of transfer payments,adjust the fiscal relationship between regions,and change the way of regional economic competition.

关 键 词：分税制 转移支付 央地财政关系 财政压力 地方政府引资竞争 

分 类 号：F812[经济管理—财政学]