非处罚性监管、审计师辞聘及后任审计师行为——基于年报问询函证据的分析  

Non-Punitive Supervision,Resignation of Auditor and Behavior of Successive Auditor:An Analysis of the Evidence Based on the Inquiry Letter of Annual Report

作　　者：胡定杰 谢军[2] HU Dingjie;XIE Jun(School of Accounting,Guangdong Baiyun University,Guangzhou 510550,China;School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510641,China)

机构地区：[1]广东白云学院会计学院,广东广州510550 [2]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州510641

出　　处：《南京审计大学学报》2021年第4期41-50,共10页Journal of Nanjing Audit University

基　　金：广东省教育厅科研项目(2013WYXM0126);广东省教育厅特色创新项目(2013WTSCX110);广东白云学院重点课题(2017BYKY01)。

摘　　要：交易所监管问询是否导致审计师主动辞聘,后任审计师在审计定价方面是否与前任存在显著差异,是值得研究的问题。基于此,以2014—2019年我国沪深两市A股上市公司年报及问询函数据进行实证分析。结果表明:(1)年报问询函与审计师辞聘存在显著正相关关系;(2)相较于国有企业,收到问询函的非国有企业更容易发生审计师辞聘;(3)收到问询函且发生审计师辞聘的企业,后任审计师会收取更高的审计费用。研究结果一方面丰富了问询函的监管效用理论,另一方面拓展了前后审计师行为研究边界,对审计师审计定价具有现实意义。Whether regulatory inquiry on the part of exchanges leads to auditor's voluntary resignation and whether there is a significant difference in audit pricing between the successor and the predecessor are worth studying.Based on this,this paper makes an empirical analysis on the annual reports and inquiry letters of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2014 to 2019.The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the annual report inquiry letter and auditor resignation.Compared with state-owned enterprises,non-state-owned enterprises receiving inquiry letters are more likely to resign auditors.The successive auditors will charge higher audit fees for enterprises receiving the inquiry letter and resigning the auditor.The research results not only enrich the Regulatory Utility Theory of inquiry letter but also expand the research boundary of auditing behavior of the successor and the predecessor,which is of practical significance to audit pricing of auditors.

关 键 词：年报问询函 审计师辞聘 审计师变更 后任审计师行为 审计定价 信息披露 监管有效性 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]