债权人主义视阈下商业银行大股东行为约束之完善  

Improvement of Behavior Restraint of Major Shareholders in Commercial Banks from the Perspective of Creditor’s Rights

作　　者：马文静 Ma Wenjing(Law School,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081,China)

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学法学院,北京100081

出　　处：《金融理论探索》2021年第3期51-58,共8页Exploration of Financial Theory

摘　　要：以利益相关者理论为基石的债权人主义是在商业银行特殊治理模式下对股东至上主义的制度修正。债权人主义下,发挥债权人的公众监督作用是强化商业银行大股东行为约束、实现债权人权益保护的重要途径。然而现行的商业银行大股东行为约束制度存在外部宏观审慎监管引发利益相关者的道德风险,内部商业银行公司治理独立董事作用难以发挥等公众监管实质缺失等问题。因此,债权人主义视阈下完善商业银行大股东行为约束,外部监管要充分发挥债权人作为重要利益相关者的公众监督作用,内部公司治理要重构董事会,发挥独立董事的"居中裁判"作用,为债权人的利益发声。The creditor’s doctrine based on the stakeholder theory is an institutional modification of the shareholder’s supremacy under the special governance model of commercial banks.Under the creditor’s principle,giving full play to the creditor’s public supervision is an important way to strengthen the behavior restraint of major shareholders of commercial banks and to realize the protection of creditors’rights and interests.However,the current behavior restraint system of major shareholders in commercial banks has some problems,such as the moral hazard of stakeholders caused by external macro-prudential supervision,and the lack of public supervision,such as the difficulty of independent directors in corporate governance of internal commercial banks.Therefore,from the perspective of creditoralism,we should improve the behavior constraint of major shareholders of commercial banks,give full play to the public supervision role of creditors as important stakeholders in external supervision,and restructure the board of directors in internal corporate governance,and give play to the role of independent directors as"intermediate judge"to voice the interests of creditors.

关 键 词：股东至上主义 债权人主义 商业银行公司治理 大股东行为约束 外部公众监督 独立董事内部约束 

分 类 号：F830.1[经济管理—金融学] DF438.1[政治法律—经济法学]