政策不稳定性如何影响环境污染——基于地市级官员变更的实证检验  

How Does Policy Instability Affects Environmental Pollution: Empirical Evidence from the Turnover of China’s Local Officers

作　　者：占华 ZHAN Hua(Nanjing University of Finance and Economics,Nanjing,210023)

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学江苏产业发展研究院

出　　处：《中国经济问题》2021年第3期76-89,共14页China Economic Studies

基　　金：江苏高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目(2018SJA0247)的资助。

摘　　要：官员变更导致的政策不确定性对环境污染的影响受到了学术界的关注,但相关文献的研究视角有待拓展。本文利用282个地级市2003-2014年的面板数据,系统检验了官员变更对环境污染的影响效应与传导机制。研究结果表明:总体上官员变更对环境质量改善有着显著的促进作用,且上述影响效应在地区与官员个人层面呈现出显著差异。影响机制检验结果表明,政企合谋、晋升激励以及政策短视等是官员变更影响环境污染的可能渠道。本文的研究丰富了官员变更影响效应领域的文献,可为环境目标约束下优化官员治理提供有益借鉴。The impact of policy uncertainty caused by the change of officials on environmental pollution has attracted the attention of the academia, but the relevant literature needs to be expanded. This paper studies the effect of official turnover on environment based on the panel data of 282 prefecture-level cities from 2003 to 2014. The results show that environmental quality benefits from official turnover. and the impacts show significant differences at the regional and individual levels of officials., The test of the mechanism shows that government-enterprise collusion, promotion incentives, and policy short-sightedness are possible channels for officials to change environmental pollution. The research in this article enriches the literature on the effect of official turnover, and provides a useful reference for optimizing official governance under the environmental constraints.

关 键 词：政策不稳定性 官员变更 环境污染 政企合谋 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学] X32[政治法律—中外政治制度]