基于FM模型的PPP项目控制权安排有效性分析  

The Effectiveness of Control-Rights Arrangements: A Study on Chinese PPP Projects Using FM Model

作　　者：黄书猛[1] HUANG Shumeng(Jimei University,Xiamen,361021)

机构地区：[1]集美大学财经学院

出　　处：《中国经济问题》2021年第3期133-144,共12页China Economic Studies

基　　金：福建省社会科学规划项目(FJ2015A027)的资助。

摘　　要：根据FM模型,PPP项目控制权安排要与项目的公共化程度、投资重要性、公私双方对项目的价值评价等因素相匹配。本文通过分析福建省PPP项目发现,PPP项目普遍在合同中设定社会资本的收益上限,社会资本没有实际剩余控制权,控制权错配现象严重。实践中,PPP项目收益分配必须遵循的PPP项目收益原则,会导致剩余分配主体缺位,与有效的控制权安排存在矛盾。通过引入公共产品消费者参与PPP项目剩余分配,并构建基于PPP收益原则的收益调控和价格调节机制,可以解决剩余分配主体缺位问题,促进PPP模式控制权的有效配置。Based on Francesconi & Muthoo’s(2006), the public-private partnership(PPP) project’s control rights should match with the project’s publicity, investment level, and assessment from both the public and private sectors. This paper studies the PPP projects in Fujian province to find that contracts have upper limits for public capital return. In contrast, public sectors do not have control rights, which is a clear indicator of the mismatch of control rights in PPP projects. In practice, if a project strictly follows the principle of PPP return distribution, it tends to create a contradiction in control rights between sectors. This paper suggests introducing consumers of public goods to share the PPP project’s residue and construct a new profit and price adjustment mechanism to solve the control right problem. The new mechanism can improve the efficiency of the PPP control-rights arrangements.

关 键 词：PPP模式 控制权安排 FM模型 PPP收益原则 

分 类 号：F283[经济管理—国民经济]