创业企业融资担保问题的三方演化博弈研究  

A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Study on the Financing Guarantee of Start-ups

作　　者：詹江 吴嘉儿 庄艺灵 易菁雯 ZHAN Jiang;WU Jia-er;ZHUANG Yi-ling;YI Jing-wen(Guangdong University of Finance and Economics,Guangzhou 510320)

机构地区：[1]广东财经大学金融学院

出　　处：《财务与金融》2021年第3期21-28,共8页Accounting and Finance

基　　金：广东财经大学金融学院2021年星火创新创业计划。

摘　　要：融资难一直是创业企业、中小微企业进一步发展的主要困境。要破解融资难这一难题,需要有效促进企业与政策性融资担保机构、银行等三方的积极合作与协调,在“大众创业、万众创新”背景下,对这一问题的探讨与研究具有重要的现实意义。本文通过构建三方演化博弈模型得出如下结论:(1)确定最优风险分担比成为融资担保政策考量的重要环节;(2)适当增加银行贷款率,提高银行放款意愿,关键要解决企业的成本负担;(3)对政策性担保机构而言,需要在依靠自身经营积累的盈余公积补充资本金与依靠财政补贴两者之间做出权衡。Difficulty in financing has always been the main predicament for the further development of startups,small,medium and micro enterprises.To solve the difficult problem of financing,it is necessary to effectively promote the active cooperation and coordination of the three parties of enterprises,policy financing guarantee institutions and banks.In the context of"mass entrepreneurship and innovation",the discussion and research on this issue has important practical significance.By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model,this paper shows the following conclusions:(1)Determining the optimal risk sharing ratio has become an important part of the financing guarantee policy consideration.(2)Appropriately increasing the bank's loan rate and increasing the willingness of banks to lend money is the key to solving the cost burden of enterprises.(3)For policy guarantee agencies,it is necessary to make a trade-off between relying on the surplus reserve accumulated by their own operations to supplement capital and relying on fiscal fund subsidies.

关 键 词：银担合作 政策性融资担保 演化博弈 三方博弈 创新创业 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]