基于战略顾客行为的质量差异化产品定价策略  

Behavior-based pricing strategy of quality-differentiated products

作　　者：马东升 宋华明[1] 古晓宇 吴佳伟 MA Dong-sheng;SONG Hua-ming;GU Xiao-yu;WU Jia-wei(School of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Science and Technology,Nanjing 210094,China)

机构地区：[1]南京理工大学经济管理学院,南京210094

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2021年第6期76-87,共12页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172105,71571102);江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划资助项目(KYCX18_0485).

摘　　要：采用博弈论方法构建竞争企业两周期动态定价模型,研究基于战略顾客行为的质量差异化产品最优定价策略,并分析基于行为的定价(behavior-based pricing,BBP)对企业利润的影响.研究结论表明:1)企业相对生产效率和决策顺序是影响BBP策略选择的关键因素;2)当竞争企业相对生产效率差异较大时,BBP策略保护弱势企业利润并且损害强势企业利润,从而加剧行业竞争;3)拥有信息优势的企业单独采用BBP策略时,不仅自身利润降低,也会损害竞争对手利润,从而导致“损人不利己”的双输局面,这与直觉相悖.最后,选择实际企业数据对本文的模型和结论进行说明验证.A two-period dynamic pricing model for competing firms is established with game theory to investigate the behavior-based pricing(BBP)strategy of quality-differentiated products and its impact on firms'profits.The main results show that:1)The relative production efficiency and firms'decision order are two key factors influencing the choice of firms'BBP strategy;2)When the relative production efficiency differs greatly,BBP protects disadvantageous firms1 profits but damages advantageous firms’profits,thereby intensifying competition;3)If the firm who can monopolize customer information uses BBP,contrary to our intuition,not only this firm’s own profits but also its competitor’s profits will be hampered,and resulting in a“lose-lose”situation.Finally,an actual enterprise example verifies our models and reveals management implications.

关 键 词：基于行为的定价 质量差异化 动态定价 战略顾客行为 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F274