供给过剩条件下双寡头非合作博弈模型研究  

Research on Duopoly Non-cooperative Game Model under the Conditions of Supply Surplus

作　　者：左大培[1] 康迎 陈宇鸣 Zuo Dapei;Kang Ying;Chen Yuming

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院经济研究所,北京102488 [2]中国社会科学院经济学院,北京102488

出　　处：《当代经济研究》2021年第7期48-60,F0003,共14页Contemporary Economic Research

摘　　要：戴维逊(Carl Davidson)和德奈克尔(Raymond Deneckere)于1986年发表的双寡头两阶段博弈文章,为通过数学模型说明市场经济中产品市场上的供给过剩提供了基础。但是其数量化推论本身却存在着不少漏洞甚至错误,该文对大厂商战略支撑集上界断点的讨论存在着根本性的疏忽,其数学推导并不能证明断点存在性。模型以产品供不应求时决定哪些购买者能够买到产品的"按比例配给规则"为基础,证明在市场出清的价格上,如果需求的价格弹性小于1,各企业产品供给给定下的价格博弈就只能有混合战略均衡,每个企业所有可能的产品报价都会高于使市场出清的产品价格。戴维逊和德奈克尔的论文有其意义和贡献,论文的漏洞和错误则需要补充和纠正。The article concerning Duopoly Game published by Carl Davidson and Raymond Deneckere in 1986 provides a foundation for illustrating the supply surplus in product market of market economy with a mathematical model. But its quantitative inference itself has a few loop holes, even errors. In the article mentioned above, there is a fundamental negligence in the discussion of the breakpoint of the upper bound of the strategic support set for large manufacturers, and its mathematical derivation can not prove the existence of the breakpoint. The model is based on the "proportional rationing rule" that determines which buyers can obtain products when the products are underproductive. It is proved that, at the price of market clearing, if the price elasticity of demand is less than 1, the price game under the given product supply of each enterprise can only take mixed strategic equilibrium, and all possible product quotations by each enterprise will be higher than the product prices at market clearing. Davidson and Deneckere ’s articles have their own significance and contribute much,while their loopholes and mistakes need to be supplemented and corrected.

关 键 词：寡头垄断 供给过剩 价格博弈 混合战略均衡 

分 类 号：F016[经济管理—政治经济学]