罗兰茨对延展认知的现象学阐释及其局限  

Rowlands’Phenomenological Interpretation of Extended Cognition and Its Limitations

作　　者：戴潘[1] DAI Pan

机构地区：[1]上海社会科学院哲学研究所

出　　处：《哲学分析》2021年第4期160-174,199,共16页Philosophical Analysis

摘　　要：关于延展认知的诸多争论都可以被归结为有关“认知标志”的分歧,罗兰茨试图发展出一种能够广泛兼容经典认知观与当代认知观的认知标志理论,该理论将认知看作一种揭示或揭蔽的活动,作为揭示的认知并不关心具体的心理学功能描述,而是一种现象学意义上的心灵与认知理论,从中可以自然而然地推导出延展认知的结论。罗兰茨的理论借鉴了胡塞尔和海德格尔现象学的一些基本原则,但是他的论证仅仅给出了一种关于认知的先验描述,缺乏对于人与技术融合的构成性分析,而这是从现象学视角来论证延展认知的必需环节。Many controversies about extended cognition can be attributed to the divergence of“the mark of cognition”.Rowlands attempts to develop a theory of cognitive mark which can be widely compatible with the classical and contemporary cognitive views.The theory regards cognition as an activity of revelation or disclosure.As a revealing activity,it does not care about the specific description of psychological functions,but a phenomenological one from which we can naturally deduce the conclusion of extended cognition.Rowlands’theory draws lessons from some basic principles of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenology,but his argument only gives a transcendental description of cognition,and lacks the constructive analysis of the integration of human and technology,which is the necessary step of extending cognition from the perspective of phenomenology.

关 键 词：具身认知 延展认知 现象学 认知科学 

分 类 号：B80[哲学宗教—思维科学]