人权主体的诠释学思辨:四种视角  

Hermeneutic Thinking on the Subject of Human Rights:Four Perspectives

作　　者：高礼杰[1,2] Gao Lijie

机构地区：[1]西南政法大学哲学系 [2]西南政法大学人权研究院

出　　处：《人权》2021年第2期186-198,共13页Human Rights

基　　金：中国博士后基金会项目“叙事人权理论研究”(2016M602644);重庆市博士后特别资助项目(XM2016010)阶段性成果。

摘　　要：依诠释学观点,人权源于对主体存在方式的解释。不同的主体诠释学对应着不同的人权内容。把人权解释为"自我"和"他我"的权利,虽能使人权摆脱"神权"和"主权",但在实践中容易导致人权的话语暴力和政治霸权。把人权解释为"他者"的权利,虽符合政治多元主义的现实,却消解了人权中的主体观念,在实践中容易导致人权的虚无主义。而把人权解释为"自身"的权利,实际上承认了个人与族类、个人与共同体之间的连续性,同时避免实践中的人权普世主义和相对主义,进而提供一种较为合理的、对人权本原的非排他性认识。From the view of human rights hermeneutics, the interpretation of the human rights subject can be understood as the philosophical foundation of human rights.As the rights of "Ego" and "Another",human rights will be rid of the supreme power of the "God" and "nation",while it dooms the dilemma of solipsism and hegemony.As the right of "the Other",human rights will correspond to the reality of political pluralism, however that theory appears to be too deconstructive and may lead to human rights nihilism.By accepting the continuity between individuality and community, a more feasible and non-exclusive approach is to adopt the idea of "Self" to better understand the nature of human rights, thus avoiding extreme human rights universality and relativism.

关 键 词：人权主体 自我 他我 他者 自身 

分 类 号：D034.5[政治法律—政治学]